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I. INTRODUCTION

I would like to begin by thanking the University of Miami
Inter-American Law Review for inviting me to participate in this
Symposium and for the very "warm" reception I have received
here in Miami.
I have been asked to comment on Mr. Thomure's paper and
to discuss whether the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) Chapter 20 dispute settlement system would function
in the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). These are
both difficult tasks because Mr. Thomure has raised a lot of interesting and thoughtful ideas, and because it is hard to recommend a dispute settlement system for a set of obligations that
does not yet exist. In any event, I am up for the challenge.
Mr. Thomure has made some very interesting observations
and proposals. I agree with much of what he has said, but I confess that I do not agree with all of it. First, I will primarily address Mr. Thomure's general thesis, and then I will consider the
question of whether the Chapter 20 system would serve the
FTAA.
* The Author is General Counsel, Trade Law Division at the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Canada. The views expressed herein do not necessarily
represent those of the Government of Canada.
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II. MR. THOMURE'S PAPER: THE ADDITION OF AN APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
Mr. Thomure's thesis is essentially that the NAFTA Chapter
20 dispute settlement procedure should be improved, and the
best way to improve it is by adding a process for appealing panel
decisions. That idea is certainly worth debating. Mr. Thomure's
proposal presents problems in the reasons he cites for requiring
improvements to Chapter 20, and hence for requiring appellate
review of the NAFTA panels. I want to address those reasons
because they are relevant to what I propose to say about the
FTAA dispute settlement system.
If I understand Mr. Thomure's position correctly, Chapter 20
must be improved because:
(a) it is geared to facilitating negotiated agreement rather
than to adjudicating disputes;
(b) weaker political parties will be frustrated and coerced
into agreeing to terms under a compromise settlement;
(c) Commission decisions are made by consensus, so a
party's request to establish a panel may be blocked by a Commission member;
(d) an appellate procedure will ensure that panelists do not
decide cases along national lines, and that decisions will be
based on law rather than politics;
(e) an appellate procedure will enable parties to enforce
panel decisions.
I agree with Mr. Thomure's first observation that the dispute settlement mechanism is geared toward facilitating negotiated agreement rather than dispute adjudication. It is, and it
should be. We are dealing with disagreements between sovereign states about international treaty obligations, and any violation of those obligations constitutes very serious misconduct at
international law. Therefore, state parties should make every
effort to resolve their disagreements through consultations,
which are held in camera, before escalating the matter to a
semipublic adversarial panel process involving allegations of
treaty violation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute
settlement system also enjoins states to seek to arrive at mutually satisfactory solutions and to leave the adjudicative process
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as the last resort to be accessed when all other efforts to resolve
1
the matter have failed.
Mr. Thomure's second concern is that weaker parties will be
forced to agree to compromise solutions instead of having their
rights vindicated by an adjudicative panel. I think history
proves the contrary; David has often taken Goliath to dispute
settlement, under the Canada-U.S. FTA, under NAFTA, and under the WTO, and Goliath has often been found to be in the
wrong. Thus, having a consultations phase is not, in my view, a
weakness of the NAFTA Chapter 20.
Mr. Thomure's third complaint about Chapter 20 is that one
party can block the establishment of a panel by the Free Trade
Commission (Commission) because all Commission decisions
must be made by consensus. I read Chapter 20 quite differently.
While it is true that Chapter 20 provides that all Commission
decisions shall be taken by consensus, 2 this does not present an
impediment as far as the establishment of panels is concerned.
This is because panels are not established by Commission decision. The Commission has no discretion once a complaining
party submits a request for the establishment of a panel. Chapter 20 stipulates that the Commission "shall" establish it.3
Mr. Thomure calls for appellate review of Chapter 20 panel
decisions to guard against panelists deciding cases along national lines and to ensure that decisions are based on law rather
than politics. Again, history proves that nationality is simply
not a factor. It wasn't under the FTA, and it has not been under
the NAFTA. In fact, most decisions have been unanimous.
Moreover, Chapter 20 permits the appointment of nonnationals
to sit on panels, and the one and only Chapter 20 panel estab4
lished to date included a nonnational.
It must be borne in mind that Chapter 20 panelists chosen
by the parties are highly respected experts who feel a responsibility to the system, and whose professional integrity is at stake.
1. See, e.g., Understandingon Rules and ProceduresGoverning the Settlement oDis-

putes, Marakesh Agreement Establishingthe World Trade Agreement, art. IH(7), Annex 2,
33 I.L.M. 112 (1994).

2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
605 (1993), art. 2001(4) [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. Id. art. 2008(2).
4. In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural
Products(Supply Management), File No. CDA-95-2008-01, Apr. 12, 1996.
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The decisions are well-reasoned and firmly grounded in law.
Finally, Mr. Thomure suggests that establishing an appellate review will improve the system because it will encourage enforcement of panel decisions. Again, enforcement has not really
been an insurmountable problem under either the FTA or
NAFTA, and as Mr. Thomure has correctly pointed out, Article
2019 sets out action that may be taken by the "winner" for
nonimplementation, including suspension of benefits.
Enforcement was a recognized problem under the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), because a single
party (i.e., the losing party) could block adoption of a panel report, and this actually happened on several occasions. The new
system under the WTO eliminates this problem because such
blocking is only possible through consensus.5
It may be argued that there is stricter accountability under
the new dispute settlement system in the WTO than under the
NAFTA as far as enforcement is concerned, because the losing
party is specifically required to let WTO members know how it is
giving effect to a panel decision. In the WTO, the losing party
has to inform the Dispute Settlement Body within thirty days after the adoption of a panel decision of its intentions in respect of
implementation. 6 In the NAFTA, the losing party does not report in a similar way to the Commission. Thus, I agree with Mr.
Thomure's view that the WTO provisions appear to more rigorously address enforcement issues than do the NAFTA rules, but
I submit that accountability must necessarily be more rigorous
in an institution of 130 members, as opposed to an institution of
only three.
I would not necessarily link the existence of an Appellate
Body in the WTO to greater enforceability of panel decisions.
The Appellate Body is not mandated to enforce panel decisions;
rather, it must consider only issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the panel. If the panel has not erred in law,
the panel decision is upheld-not enforced. In fact, the existence
of the Appellate Body has not obviated the need for recourse to
Article 21(3) of the DSU, which provides for arbitration in the
event parties cannot agree on a reasonable time for implemen5. Final Act, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994), art. 16(4) [hereinafter DSUJ.
6. Id. art. 21(3).
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tation. For example, in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
the parties went to arbitration on implementation, even though
the Appellate Body had essentially confirmed the panel's decision on the merits.
I would like to make one final observation about Mr. Thomure's paper before moving to the FTAA, and let me emphasize
that this is a purely personal point of view. While I am not convinced that we need to add an appellate procedure to the
NAFTA, I think it is worth debating the idea, but for reasons
other than those which Mr. Thomure advances. The NAFTA is a
complicated treaty in many respects, and the questions that
arise under it often concern complex and specialized factual matters. In addition, the number of decisions interpreting the
agreement and its predecessor are precious few, so guidance is
hard to obtain. Panelists, expert and highly respected though
they are, are susceptible to making an error of law, or to developing an interpretation that has far-reaching ramifications beyond
the panel's "field of vision." Appellate review allows for correction when appropriate-it is a nice fig leaf. The fact is, so far we
have not needed it.

III. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE FTAA
Would the NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute settlement mechanism work for the FTAA? The question is premature. How can
we determine what system will work when we do not know what
the obligations are? Or what form the agreement will take? The
dispute settlement mechanism must be tailored to the rules to be
established under the FTAA, so until we have those rules, we
should not attempt to formulate a new dispute settlement
mechanism, or emulate an existing system. I was not invited to
this symposium, however, to get away with that kind of answer,
so let me try to share some of my thoughts on dispute settlement
under the FTAA.
The first thing we should consider is whether it would be
useful to follow the precedent in the NAFTA of establishing
mechanisms that provide for dispute avoidance or settlement at
a level other than government-to-government proceedings-in
7. Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appelllate Body Report, WTO Doc. AB1996-2, at 17-25 (Oct. 4, 1996).
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other words, setting out procedures for matters to be dealt with
internally instead of through adversarial government action.
For example, regarding rules of origin in the NAFTA, any exporter may obtain a binding advance ruling on whether its product meets a value-content test or qualifies as an originating
good. 8 There is also a procedure for a bid challenge review on
procurement matters,9 and for the conduct of safeguard or emergency action proceedings.10 The Intellectual Property Chapter
requires parties to ensure that procedures are available under
domestic law to permit taking action against infringement of Intellectual Property rights set out in the Intellectual Property
Chapter." Finally, Chapter Eleven B sets out the investor-state
dispute settlement regime.
All of these procedures contribute to faithful observance of
the obligations set out in the treaty, and as such, form part of
the dispute avoidance or settlement mechanisms of the NAFTA.
The FTAA negotiators may well wish to consider adopting similar provisions in the FTAA.
As for government-to-government dispute settlement procedures, the NAFTA Chapter 20 is without a doubt a useful model
for the FTAA negotiators. It promotes settlement through consultations and provides clear rules for resolving matters through
adjudicative means when consultations fail to resolve them. It
ensures procedural fairness by establishing a right to at least
one hearing, and provides disputing parties the opportunity to
make written submissions. Timelines are set out, and no one
party can delay or block the process.
Procedural rules have been developed to complement these
requirements,12 which provide to panels a considerable degree of
flexibility in seeking additional evidence or information, as they
may require. There is opportunity to comment on a panel's initial report containing findings of fact and a determination as to
whether a measure is inconsistent with the obligations set out in
the agreement.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 509.
Id. art. 1017.
Id. ch. 8.
Id. art. 1714(1).
Model Rules of Procedurefor Chapter 20 of the North American Free Trade Agree-

ment and Supplementary Procedures Pursuantto Rule 35 on the Availability of Information,

Canada Gaz., pt. I, 3408, Sept. 23, 1995.
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Third party participation is available to the member that is
not a full-fledged disputing party, but which has an interest in
the proceedings. A third party is entitled to attend all hearings
and to receive parties' written submissions, and to make written
and oral submissions to the panel. 13 Post-decision procedures
permit suspension of benefits of equivalent effect for nonimplementation after thirty days.14
Chapter 20 and its predecessor, Chapter Eighteen under the
Panel decisions are well-written,
FTA, have worked well.
thoughtful, and well-reasoned. Of the six decisions issued to
date 15 under both the FTA and the NAFTA, all but one have been
unanimous.' 6 Naturally, those whose interests have been protected by Chapter 20, like the Canadian dairy and poultry industries, sing its praises, while those who represent losing constituencies are sometimes-shall we say-uncomplimentary.
The system is not perfect; there is always room for improvement and the FTAA negotiators should benefit from our
"lessons learned."
One problem we have had is in establishing the Chapter 20
roster. The parties were to have appointed up to thirty individuals to serve as panelists by January 1, 1994.17 Roster members are to be appointed by consensus for a renewable three-year
term.' 8 There have been no appointments to date. Although
Chapter 20 permits selection of panelists who are not on the roster, a disputing party may exercise a pre-emptory challenge
19
As long as
against anyone selected who is not on the roster.
there is no roster, a preemptory challenge privilege enables a
party to delay the establishment of a panel and hence the dispute settlement process indefinitely.
13. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2013.
14. Id. art. 2019.
15. See In the Matterof Canada'sLanding Requirements for Pacific Coast Salmon and
Herring,Oct. 16, 1989, 12 ITRD 1026; Lobstersfrom Canada,No. USA-89-1807-01, May 25,
1990, 12 ITRD 1653; In the Matter of Article 304 and the Definition of Direct Costs, No. USA-

92-1807-01, June 8, 1992, 14 ITRD 2326; In the Matter of the Interpretationof and Canada's
Compliance With Article 701(3) With Respect to Durum Wheat Sales, No. CDA-92-1807-01,
Feb. 8, 1993, 15 ITRD 2270; In the Matterof Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import, Distribution and Sale of U.H.T. Milk from Quebec, No. USA-93-1807-01, June 3, 1993, 16 ITRD

1769; Supply Management.
16. Lobstersfrom Canada,No. USA-89-1807-01, May 25, 1990, 12 ITRD 1653.
17. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2009(1).
18. Id.
19. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2011(3).
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Would governments agree to any limitations in that regard?
I do not know for sure, but the current situation is unsatisfactory
in my view. The architects of the WTO dispute settlement system may have the better idea. Under the WTO, if disputing
parties cannot agree on panelists within a certain time, the Director General of the WTO will select them. 20 The current Director General has done just that in the European Community (EC)
case against the United States on Helms Burton. 21 The FTAA
drafters will need to consider which system, the NAFTA or WTO,
best suits their objectives in this regard.
The confidentiality requirement has also posed difficulties.
Under Chapter 20, panel hearings, deliberations, the initial report, and some of the written submissions are confidential. In
Supply Management,22 the initial report was leaked and subsequently quoted (and misquoted) in the press. Yet the parties and
panelists could not acknowledge what everyone knew to be the
bottom line-that the panel had found in Canada's favor, at least
at the initial report stage. Similar things occurred with respect
to the United State's case against Canada in the WTO on SplitRun Magazines,2 3 and in Canada's case against Japan. 24
It has been suggested that the confidentiality rules should
be relaxed somewhat to avoid these situations and to increase
the transparency of the process. I believe there is considerable
merit in keeping the initial report confidential, because the disputing parties still have a chance to influence the decision at
that stage, and the panel may find it difficult to reverse or significantly alter its findings on the basis of parties' post-interim
report comments when the contents of the interim report are
widely known. However, experience indicates that leaks are
bound to occur when matters of public interest are at stake, and
it may be that the NAFTA parties should concede defeat in this
respect. Thus, confidentiality is a feature of Chapter 20 that the
FTAA negotiators should consider carefully.

20. DSU, supra note 5, art. 8(7).
21. United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic SolidarityAct, WT/DS38/3.
22. In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural
Products(Supply Management), CDA-95-2008-01, Apr. 12, 1996.
23. Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals,Mar. 14, 1997 (Final Report
not yet adopted).
24. Japan-Taxeson Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. AB-19962, at 17-25 (Oct. 4, 1996).
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The Chapter 20 third party procedure may not be the best
model for the FTAA. The system was adapted from a bilateral
agreement-namely, the Canada-U.S. FTA. While it may have
made the transition to a trilateral agreement reasonably well,
the transition to an agreement with thirty-four parties may
prove to be more difficult. A third party under Chapter 20 has
all manner of rights. Participation is unconditional, and attendance at all hearings is guaranteed, as is receipt of the disputing
parties' written submissions.2 5 Further, it is entitled to make
written and oral submissions. 26 Under the NAFTA, these farreaching rights can belong only to one party, which is quite
manageable. A dispute settlement under the FTAA, however,
must serve thirty-four parties. In a situation in which thirty-two
of the thirty-four parties seek to participate as third parties using the NAFTA model of full and unconditional participation, the
dispute settlement mechanism would be unable to rise to the occasion. Even if only one-half of the FTAA parties wanted to exercise third party rights, the panel process could be quite cumbersome.
The WT O system may be a better model for third party participation. There, third party participation is not unconditional-it is necessary to have a "substantial interest" in a matter before a panel,27 and participation is limited. Although third
parties have an opportunity to be heard and to make written
submissions to the panel, they receive only the submissions for
the first hearing, 28 and they are usually not permitted to attend
all hearings. It is true that the WTO third party system has its
critics, since some believe that third parties should have access
to all written submissions and hearings, and not only to those for
the first hearing. However, in an institution with 130 members,
perhaps some limits are necessary to ensure that the dispute
Perhaps the
resolution mechanism is not overly burdened.
FTAA drafters, in considering the merits of the WTO third party
process, could improve upon it by setting out more clearly the
criteria for participating as a third party. For example, it may
be useful to define what is meant by having a "substantial interest" in a matter before the panel.

25.
26.
27.
28.

NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2013.
Id.
DSU, supra note 5, art. 10(2).
Id. art. 10.3.
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Another feature of the NAFTA Chapter 20 that may not
serve the FTAA very well is the requirement that the Free Trade
Commission meet following consultations to seek to resolve the
dispute.2 9 This may work for a trilateral institution like the
Commission. However, it may not be ideal for an institution of
thirty-four parties. Perhaps if the ministerial meeting did not
include all FTAA ministers, but only ministers from disputing
parties, it would contribute to the process. However, once one
gets beyond a handful of participants, as may often be the case,
it may be very difficult to find a solution that is acceptable to all
concerned parties.
With respect to the implementation of panel decisions,
Chapter 20 may not be the appropriate model for the FTAA.
Chapter 20 imposes no time limits for implementation. But the
right to suspend benefits arises fairly quickly-thirty days after
the final report.8 0 Among three parties, it may be possible to
work out mutually agreed upon solutions in a reasonably short
period of time. Among several, it is more complicated and there
could be a need to extend the deadline beyond thirty days.
The WTO procedure, however, may provide useful guidance
for the FTAA. There, parties may have a "reasonable period of
time" to comply with panel decisions. 31 If they prove unsuccessful, the winning party can have an arbitrator determine what
the "reasonable period of time" would be under the circumstances. As I mentioned earlier, this procedure was invoked in
the Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages case. 32 This is an avenue that is not available under the NAFTA, and it may be that
the FTAA negotiators should give it some study and consideration.
From time to time, NAFTA scholars posit the idea of a
"permanent" panel for settling disputes which could be composed
of panelists appointed for fixed terms. I can see some benefits to
having a permanent body to whom you can turn quickly, and bypass the time consuming panelist selection process. Such a trade
tribunal would amass experience and expertise, and panelists
would not need to feel each other out and develop working rela-

29.
30.
31.
32.

NAFTA, supranote 2, art. 2007(4).
Id. art. 2019.
DSU, supra note 5, art 21(3).
Supra, note 7.
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tionships at the start of each case, as in the present system.
However, these benefits may be outweighed by the disadvantages of establishing such an institution. The costs would be a
problem; panelist and staff salaries, office costs, and so forth,
would add up. In any event, if we had had a permanent body
during the life of the FTA and under the NAFTA, the panelists
would have been lonelier than the Maytag repairman because we
have only had six cases since 1989.
The NAFTA does not appear to need such an institution.
The WTO does not have one either, except at the appellate level.
It may be politically too difficult to decide on composition for a
permanent WTO panel. What about a permanent dispute settlement body under the FTAA? Would disagreement on composition be insurmountable? Would such a body be busy enough?
It is hard to say.
My final observation relates to appellate review. Should the
FTAA dispute settlement system include the possibility for appeal of panel decisions? I suspect that Mr. Thomure would say it
should. I will say that it probably will. Let us not forget that
the establishment of an Appellate Body in the WTO was largely
due to United States efforts. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States was reluctant to give up the right it
had enjoyed and used effectively under the GATT to block the
adoption of panel decisions. The quid pro quo for giving up that
power was the establishment of the WTO Appellate Body to
provide "insurance" against a very bad decision-the fig leaf, if
you will. The United States may take the same approach in the
FTAA negotiations. And given the stellar performance of the
Appellate Body at the WTO thus far, it may be a very good idea
indeed.

